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Safeguarding the Longue Durée:
Environmental Rights in the
Canadian Constitution
Lynda M. Collins*

I. INTRODUCTION
Before 1982, the only environmental right that could be found in the
Canadian Constitution was the right to regulate, and even that was
ambiguous.1 The absence of an explicit environmental protection power in
the Constitution has created much confusion,2 but Canadian courts have
consistently stepped in to fill the breach. In case after case, the Supreme
Court of Canada has affirmed federal, 3 provincial4 and even municipal 5
governments’ powers to regulate for environmental protection. The
question left unanswered is when (or whether) Canadian governments
have an obligation to do so.6 Is there a right to environmental protection in
the Canadian Constitution and, if so, what is its locus and content? Is a
constitutional amendment necessary to bring Canada in line with the
majority of modern democracies around the world, which enjoy
constitutional environmental protection? This article will argue that
*
Lynda Collins is a professor with the Centre for Environmental Law and Global
Sustainability at the University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law.
1
See Penny Becklumb, “Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction to Regulate Environmental
Issues” (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2013).
2
See generally Kathryn Harrison, Passing the Buck: Federalism and Canadian
Environmental Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996); Jean Leclair, “L’étendue du pouvoir
constitutionnel des provinces et de l’État central canadiens en matière d’évaluation des incidences
environnementales” in Hélène Trudeau & Ejaan Mackay, L’environnement: À quel prix? (Éditions
Thémis: Montreal, 1995).
3
See e.g., R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401
(S.C.C.); R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (S.C.C.).
4
See e.g., Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] S.C.J. No. 62, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031
(S.C.C.).
5
See e.g., 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001]
S.C.J. No. 42, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.).
6
See generally British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., [2004] S.C.J. No. 33,
[2004] 2 S.C.R. 74, 2004 SCC 38, at para. 81 (S.C.C.).
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Canada’s Constitution does provide protection for the environmental rights
of its citizens. There is nothing to prevent courts from recognizing
environmental deprivations of the existing rights enshrined in our
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms7 and much authority in support
of this approach. Moreover, a broader right to a healthy environment may
be found in Aboriginal rights under section 35 and/or as an unwritten
constitutional principle.
Part II defines environmental human rights, contrasting the “existing
rights” approach with the concept of a free-standing right to
environmental quality. Part III addresses the threshold question of state
action in environmental rights claims. In Part IV, the article evaluates the
environmental rights of Aboriginal peoples under section 35 of the
Constitution, and explains that courts have already recognized the
environmental content of section 35 and will continue to do so. Part V
evaluates the viability of environmental claims under the Charter and
discusses ongoing litigation on this question. Part VI proposes the
recognition of the right to a healthy environment as an unwritten
constitutional principle. The author argues that there is no value more
fundamental than that of a healthy environment and if it is not mentioned
in the Constitution, then this must be because the requirement of
environmental protection is so fundamental as to be self-evident. Part VII
outlines the argument for explicit constitutional recognition of the right
to a healthy environment and Part VIII presents a brief conclusion.

II. DEFINING ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS
There are two distinct approaches to environmental human rights
discernible in international and domestic scholarship and practice: (i) the
recognition of environmental deprivations of existing human rights, (ii) the
creation of an independent human right to a healthy environment.8

7
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
8
See generally D. Anton & D. Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) [hereinafter “Anton & Shelton”]; D. Shelton, ed.,
Human Rights and the Environment (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011); Lynda M.
Collins, “Are we There Yet? The Right to Environment in International and European Law” (2007)
3(2) McGill Int’l J. Sustainable Development L. & Pol’y 119 [hereinafter “Collins, ‘Right to
Environment’”]; John Lee, “The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human Right
to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law” (2000) 25 Colum. J. Envtl.
L. 283 [hereinafter “Lee”].

(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d)

ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS

521

The existing rights approach grounds environmental entitlements
within recognized human rights such as the rights to life, liberty, security
of the person, equality, privacy and family life, culture, and health (among
others).9 Judges in countries with constitutions similar to our own have had
no difficulty in recognizing environmental deprivations of existing rights.
In one environmental claim, for example, the Supreme Court of Pakistan
held that “[a]ny action taken which may create hazards of life will be
encroaching upon the person rights of a citizen to enjoy the life according
to law”.10 The Indian Supreme Court has gone further, holding that “[t]he
right to life…includes the right of enjoyment of pollution-free water and
air for full enjoyment of life”.11 Nigeria’s Federal High Court has similarly
declared that the right to life enshrined in that country’s constitution
“inevitably” includes the right to a “clean, poison-free, healthy
environment”. 12 Although some judges and commentators suggest the
recognition of new environmental content within existing rights, 13
substantive modifications to existing rights may be unnecessary. What is
required is an ecologically literate approach to the various threats to human
rights, such as the right to life, in their current formulations:
An ecologically literate reading of laws designed to protect people is
one that recognizes that in many cases, the protection of people will
require the protection of the environment. In the realm of human rights,
it may be as simple as recognizing that an individual who is killed by a
state-permitted air emission is equally dead as one who is shot by state
police. Both should be protected from the deprivation of life, even
though the former death is mediated by environmental forces while the
latter is not.14

See Anton & Shelton, id.; Collins, “Right to Environment”, id., at 128.
Zia v. WAPDA, PLD 1994 Supreme Court 693.
11
Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar et al., WP (Civil) No. 381 of 1988, D/-9-1-91 (Supreme
Court of India); see also M.C. Mehta v. India, WP (Civil) No 12739 of 1985 (Supreme Court of
India); Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, [1996] 5 Supreme Court Cases
281, per Kuldip Singh J.; Jona Razzaque, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2004), at 87 et seq.
12
Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. Nigeria Ltd., Order of the Federal High
Court of Nigeria in the Benin Judicial Division Holden at Court Benin City, November 14, 2005.
See Kaniye S.A. Ebeku, “Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment and Human Rights
Approaches to Environmental Protection in Nigeria: Gbemre v. Shell Revisited” (2008) Vol. 16:3
RECIEL 312.
13
See e.g., Lee, supra, note 8, at 291-92.
14
Lynda M. Collins, “An Ecologically Literate Reading of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms” (2009) 26 Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues 7 [hereinafter “Collins,
‘Ecologically Literate Reading of the Canadian Charter’”], at 8. See also Lynda M. Collins,
9

10

522

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Indeed, to deny a constitutional remedy for environmental deprivations of
recognized rights would in effect be to read in an environmental exception
or exemption.
Another way of approaching existing rights in this context is to
recognize environmental quality as a necessary precondition to their
enjoyment. As Weeramantry J. of the International Court of Justice has
explained:
The protection of the environment is … a vital part of contemporary
human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous human
rights such as the right to health and the right to life itself. It is scarcely
necessary to elaborate on this, as damage to the environment can impair
and undermine all the human rights spoken of in the Universal
Declaration and other human rights instruments.15

A second school of thought conceptualizes the right to a healthy
environment16 as a free-standing, independent right that encompasses but
extends beyond the content of existing rights such as the right to life.
While scholars have viewed the emergence of environmental rights as an
expansion of human rights doctrine,17 this is scientifically backward. The
biophysical reality is that all other rights, including the right to life itself,
depend on a viable environment. From this perspective, the right to
environment may be seen as the primary, indeed irreducible, human
right.18 If this is correct then it would appear to make good sense explicitly
to recognize this ancestor of all rights. In the comparative constitutional
context, there is a robust body of empirical data demonstrating that the
incorporation of an explicit right to environment leads to improved
environmental performance, with associated benefits to human health. 19
“The United Nations, Human Rights and the Environment” in Louis J. Kotzé & Anna Grear eds.,
Research Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment” (London: Edward Elgar, 2015).
15
See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 37 I.L.M. at 206.
16
Various formulations of the independent right to environment have been proposed
(e.g., “ecologically balanced”, “safe”, “clean”, etc.). The author favours the modifier “healthy” as it
can apply in both anthropocentric and eco-centric ways (denoting an environment that is healthy for
humans and one that is healthy in its own right). Collins, “Right to Environment”, supra, note 8,
at 127-36. See also Michael Burger, “Bi-Polar and Polycentric Approaches to Human Rights and the
Environment” (2003) 28 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 371, at 376.
17
See e.g., Jennifer A. Downs, “Note: A Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment:
An Argument for a Third Generation Right” (1993) 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 351.
18
See Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(July 30, 1993), 33 ILM 173 [hereinafter “Minors Oposa”], at 187.
19
While the cause-and-effect relationships between constitutional provisions and social or
environmental outcomes are ferociously complex, the leading scholarship in this area has employed
sophisticated multi-tiered analysis to control for possible confounding factors (e.g., economic
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If one accepts the premise that “the raison d’etre of the modern state is to
promote the interests of its citizens”,20 then this evidence strongly supports
recognition of an independent constitutional right to environment.
The major analytical challenge in the “independent right” approach is
the question of content. If a free-standing right to environment exists, then
it must presumably have some content beyond that contained in the
recognized rights to life, health, security of the person, etc. A thorough
analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this article, but a few
introductory points can be made. Scholars have proposed intergenerational
equity, the protection of aesthetic interests and the Precautionary Principle
as unique aspects of the right to environment. 21 The doctrine of
intergenerational equity posits the present generation of humans as
simultaneously beneficiaries and trustees of a global environmental trust,
recognizing environmental rights for future humans. 22 The right to
aesthetic protection extends environmental entitlement beyond the means
of life to the requirements of a life worth living; it would give legal effect
to the moral duty “not to turn a beautiful landscape into a moonscape”.23

improvement concurrent with constitutional amendment). In the result, the case for environmental
benefits resulting from constitutional protection is very strong. See David Richard Boyd, The
Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the
Environment (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) [hereinafter “Boyd, The Environmental Rights
Revolution”]; David Richard Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada’s
Constitution (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) [hereinafter “Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment”];
Christopher Jeffords & Lanse Minkler, 2014, “Do Constitutions Matter? The Effects of Constitutional
Environmental Rights Provisions on Environmental Outcomes”, Working papers 2014-16, University
of Connecticut, Department of Economics, online: <https://ideas.repec.org/p/ uct/uconnp/201416.html> (last visited April 1, 2015); James R. May, “Constituting Environmental Rights Worldwide”
(2006) 23 Pace Envtl.. L. Rev. 113 [hereinafter “May”]; Joshua C. Gellers, “Explaining the Emergence
of Constitutional Environmental Rights: A Global Quantitative Analysis” (2015) 1 Journal of Human
Rights and the Environment 75; Tim Hayward, “Constitutional Environmental Rights: A Case for
Political Analysis” (2000) 48 Political Studies 558 [hereinafter “Hayward”].
20
The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, “Lord Cooke of Thorndon Lecture –
Unwritten Constitutional Principles: What is Going On?” (2006) 4 NZJPIL 147, at 151 [hereinafter
“McLachlin”].
21
Dinah Shelton, “Human Rights, Environmental Rights and the Right to Environment”
(1991) 28 Stan. J. Intl. L. 103, at 133; Lee, supra, note 8, at 337-39; Collins, “Right to
Environment”, supra, note 8, at 148-52; Edith Brown Weiss, “Our Rights and Obligations to Future
Generations for the Environment” (1990) 84 American J. Intl. L. 198, at 200-202; Edith Brown
Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and
Intergenerational Equity (Tokyo: UN University Press, 1989) [hereinafter “Weiss, In Fairness”].
22
Weiss, In Fairness, id.; Lynda M. Collins, “Revisiting the Doctrine of Intergenerational
Equity in Global Environmental Governance” (2007) 30 Dalhousie L.J. 79.
23
Klaus Bosselmann, “Human Rights and the Environment: Redefining Fundamental
Principles?” in Brendan Gleeson & Nicholas Low, eds., Governing for the Environment: Global
Problems, Ethics and Democracy (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), at 129.
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The Precautionary Principle holds that scientific uncertainty should not
preclude preventative action in the face of serious environmental threats.24
It requires legislators and courts to be conservative in the face of
environmental uncertainty and to refrain from exposing citizens to
unreasonable risk.25 For example, the Precautionary Principle suggests that
citizens should not be exposed to poorly understood chemicals where there
is a demonstrated risk of harm.26
These two contrasting approaches to environmental human rights
must be borne in mind in any examination of the place of environmental
rights in the Canadian Constitution. Arguably, Aboriginal and treaty
rights under section 35 may encompass the broader, free-standing right to
environment. Indeed, a strong argument may be made that environmental
preservation is an Aboriginal right enjoyed by all Aboriginal groups in
Canada.27 In contrast, Charter approaches will likely follow the “existing
rights” model, eschewing the more comprehensive content of the
independent right to environment. Thus, the recognition of an explicit,
robust right to a healthy environment in Canada may require
constitutional amendment. In the alternative, the Supreme Court of
Canada could recognize the right to a healthy environment (or some
other form of environmental right or obligation) as an unwritten
constitutional principle. As a threshold question, an applicant making any
of these claims will have to establish the requisite degree of state action
to invoke constitutional protection.

III. STATE ACTION
In a democratic capitalist society like Canada, the majority of
environmentally harmful activity is arguably conducted by private
enterprise. The casual observer might reasonably ask, then, why one
should seek environmental remedies in the Constitution, which only

24
See generally Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE
Region, UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/PC/10 (1990), reprinted in (1990) 1 YB Int’l. Env. L. 429, 4312;
Paul Harremoës et al., eds., The Precautionary Principle in the 20th Century: Late Lessons from
Early Warnings (London: Earthscan Publications, 2002).
25
See Lynda M. Collins, “Security of the person, peace of mind: a precautionary approach
to environmental uncertainty” (2013) 4:1 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 79.
26
Id.
27
See generally Randy Kapashesit & Murray Klippenstein, “Aboriginal Group Rights and
Environmental Protection” (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 925 [hereinafter “Kapashesit & Klippenstein”];
R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, [2006] S.C.J. No. 54, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686, at paras. 37-38 (S.C.C.).
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applies to state action.28 In the environmental context, governments may
create serious environmental harm in at least four ways.29 First, Canadian
governments operate major facilities (e.g., sewage treatment facilities,
power plants) that emit pollution into the natural environment. 30 Risks
associated with such operations include long-term, chronic exposures to
relatively low levels of contaminants, as well as the possibility of acute
environmental disasters (such as a nuclear melt-down).
Second, governments may create environmental degradation capable
of infringing constitutional rights by affirmatively permitting pollution or
other forms of environmental degradation (e.g., clear-cutting). Industrial
polluters and resource extraction companies are subject to municipal,
provincial and federal regulatory regimes requiring specific permitting of
polluting activities. 31 The regulatory issuance of a licence, permit, or
certificate of approval specifically permitting a particular environmentally
harmful emission or course of conduct would appear to meet the
requirement of state conduct.
Third, a government may create environmental harm by setting statutory
and regulatory standards that allow for the emission of harmful levels of
pollution. This can occur, for example, when regulatory standards are out of
date, or where regulation allows for the issuance of an unlimited number of
emissions permits, without regard to the total volume of contaminants
discharged in a particular area.32 Finally, governments may create
environmental harm by systematically failing to enforce environmental
legislation; environmental non-enforcement is a well-studied phenomenon in
Canada and could potentially meet the threshold for state conduct.33 I have

28

See Charter, supra, note 7, ss. 32, 52.
See Andrew Gage, “Public Health Hazards and s. 7 of the Charter” (2003), 13 J. Envtl. L. &
Prac. 1 [hereinafter “Gage”], at 20-26; Nickie Vlavianos, “Public Participation and the Disposition of
Oil and Gas Rights in Alberta” (2007) 17 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 205 [hereinafter “Vlavianos”], at 223-31;
Collins, “Ecologically Literate Reading of the Canadian Charter”, supra, note 14, at 17-18.
30
Whether the operation of such facilities is subject to Charter scrutiny appears to depend
upon whether the entity in question is governmental in nature or in the particular function implicated
by the claim. See Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844, at paras.
43-49 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Longueuil”].
31
See generally David R. Boyd, Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law
and Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) [hereinafter “Boyd, Unnatural Law”].
32
Dayna Nadine Scott, “Confronting Chronic Pollution: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Risk
and Precaution” (2008) 46(2) Osgoode Hall L.J. 293 [hereinafter “Scott”]. See also David R. Boyd,
Cleaner Greener Healthier: A Prescription for Stronger Canadian Environmental Laws and Policies
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015).
33
Id.; Boyd, Unnatural Law, supra, note 31, at 237-38; see also Nathalie J. Chalifour,
“Environmental Discrimination and the Charter’s Equality Guarantee: the Case of Drinking Water
29
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used the term “state-sponsored environmental harm” to refer broadly to
harm falling into any of these four categories.34

IV. ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS IN SECTION 35
Although their content and implementation remain contentious, the
existence of Aboriginal environmental rights in section 35 of the
Constitution is now beyond dispute. Indeed, Aboriginal and treaty rights
to hunt, fish and trap,35 to carry out integral spiritual and cultural practices,36
and to self-govern (among others) 37 are meaningless without the
environment that has supported them since time immemorial.38 In cases
such as Tsawout Indian Band v. Saanichton Marina Ltd.,39 Halfway River
First Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests),40 and Mikisew Cree
First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 41 Canadian
courts have recognized that environmental degradation may violate
for First Nations Living on Reserves” (2013) 43 R.G.D. 183 [hereinafter “Chalifour”], at 206-207
regarding Charter liability for failure to act.
34
Collins, “Ecologically Literate Reading of the Canadian Charter”, supra, note 14.
35
Lynda M. Collins & Meghan Murtha, “Indigenous Environmental Rights in Canada: the
Right to Conservation Implicit in Treaty and Aboriginal Rights to Hunt, Fish and Trap” (2010) 47:4
Alta. L.R. 959; Geoffrey W.G. Leane, “Indigenous Peoples Fishing for Justice: A Paradigmatic
Failure in Environmental Law” (1997) 7 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 279; Monique M. Ross & Cheryk Y.
Sharvit, “Forest Management in Alberta and Rights to Hunt, Trap, and Fish Under Treaty 8” (1998)
36 Alta. L. Rev. 645.
36
John Borrows, “Living Law on a Living Earth” in Law and Religious Pluralism in
Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) [hereinafter “Borrows, ‘Living Law on a Living Earth’”].
37
Theresa A. McClenaghan, “Why Should Aboriginal Peoples Exercise Governance over
Environmental Issues?” (2002) 51 UNBLJ 211.
38
See Kapashesit & Klippenstein, supra, note 27; John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous
Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) [hereinafter “Borrows, Canada’s
Indigenous Constitution”]; Borrows, “Living Law on a Living Earth”, supra, note 36; John Borrows,
“Living Between Water and Rocks: First Nations, Environmental Planning, and Democracy” (1997)
47 University of Toronto L.J. 417; L. Little Bear, “Relationship of Aboriginal People to the Land
and the Aboriginal Perspective on Aboriginal Title” in CD-ROM: Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples, For Seven Generations: An Information Legacy of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples (Ottawa: Libraxus, 1997); James (Sakej) McClenaghan, Youngblood Henderson, et. al.,
Aboriginal Tenure in the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2000), at 410-20, 256; Patrick
Macklem, “The Impact of Treaty 9 on Natural Resource Development in Northern Ontario” in
Michael Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equity, and Respect for
Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997).
39
Tsawout Indian Band v. Saanichton Marina Ltd., [1989] B.C.J. No. 563, 57 D.L.R. (4th)
161 (B.C.C.A.).
40
Halfway River First Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests), [1997] B.C.J.
No. 1494, 39 B.C.L.R. (3d) 227 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Halfway”].
41
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2001] F.C.J.
No. 1877, 214 F.T.R. 48 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter “Mikisew”].
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constitutionally protected Aboriginal resource rights. In Tsawout, the
British Columbia Court of Appeal held that construction of a marina that
would block access and cause ecological harm to shellfish habitat would
violate the applicants’ treaty right to fish. In Halfway, the British Columbia
Supreme Court (affirmed by the Court of Appeal) similarly found that
proposed logging in their traditional territories would violate the First
Nation’s treaty right to hunt, noting that:
[t]o Halfway, the Tusdzuh region is one of the last unspoiled areas of
wilderness where they can exercise their traditional way of life.
Logging even a limited area of the Tusdzuh would irrevocably change
its character.42

In Mikisew, the Federal Court-Trial Division accepted the First
Nation’s argument that “any impact on the environment would have a
corresponding impact on Mikisew’s rights to hunt and trap in the Park
due to Mikisew’s reliance on the stability of the wildlife and furbearer
populations”.43
Most recently, the Federal Court of Canada granted an injunction to
the Haida Nation suspending the 2015 commercial herring fishery in
Haida Gwaii 44 (the lands and waters of which are subject to an
Aboriginal title claim that has been characterized by the Supreme Court
of Canada as a strong prima facie claim). The Court recognized the
unique ecological values of the area, the strength of the Haida’s claim of
Aboriginal title and the depth of scientific uncertainty surrounding
sustainable harvest levels in the fishery at issue. Taking a precautionary
approach, it held that irreparable harm would ensue if the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans permitted commercial fishing in the area at issue.
While Aboriginal environmental entitlements under section 35
certainly encompass the negative right to be free from state-sponsored
environmental harm that impinges on specific protected activities,
Aboriginal title appears to encompass a broad right to conservation of the
subject lands more akin to the independent right to a healthy
42
Halfway, supra, note 40, at para. 106. Note that the Court of Appeal disagreed with the
characterization of the Tuzdah as an “unspoiled” wilderness and held that “preferred means” should
not be taken to refer to an area or the condition of an area, but rather to the methods of hunting.
Halfway River First Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests), [1997] B.C.J. No. 1494, 39
B.C.L.R. (3d) 227 (B.C.C.A.), at paras. 106, 140-142. However, these disagreements did not affect
the appeal court’s conclusion that a prima facie infringement had indeed been made out.
43
Mikisew, supra, note 41, at para. 92.
44
Haida Nation v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), [2015] F.C.J. No. 281, 2015
FC 290 (F.C.).
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environment. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that even the titleholders themselves must respect environmental quality in Aboriginal title
lands.45 In its most recent judgment, the Supreme Court also opined that the
environmental rights of Aboriginal title-holders include an intergenerational
component. In Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, the Court held that
“incursions on Aboriginal title cannot be justified if they would substantially
deprive future generations of the benefit of the land” 46 and further that
Aboriginal title lands cannot be put to uses that would “destroy the ability of
the land to sustain future generations of Aboriginal peoples”.47
The application of the precautionary principle in Haida Nation v.
Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), and of intergenerational
equity in Tsilhqot’in suggests that section 35 may indeed encompass a
relatively broad right to environmental quality.

V. ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE CHARTER
A number of Charter rights are vulnerable to infringement through
environmental harm.48 Borrows explains that environmental degradation in
traditional territories may violate the section 2(a) religious freedoms of
Aboriginal people(s): “Proponents could show that [First Nations] spiritual
beliefs concerning the Earth are holistic, deeply held, linked to their selfdefinition and fulfillment, and foster a connection with the subject of their
faith”,49 thus meeting the definition of religious belief under section 2(a).50
The next step in the section 2(a) analysis would be to demonstrate a
substantial or non-trivial interference with the religious practice or belief in
question, and this would require a contextual approach that takes into
account the relevant Aboriginal legal perspective.51
A second possible Charter right that may be implicated in cases of
serious environmental harm is the right to equality under section 15.
Canadian environmental law regimes do not regulate total emissions into a
45
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257, 2014
SCC 44, at para. 121 (S.C.C.).
46
Id., at para. 86.
47
Id., at para. 121.
48
See generally Collins “Ecologically Literate Reading of the Canadian Charter”, supra, note 14;
see also Sophie Thériault & David Robitaille, “Les droits environnementaux dans la Charte des droits et
libertés de la personne du Québec : Pistes de réflexion”, (2011) 57 Revue de droit de McGill 211.
49
Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 38, at 253.
50
See Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, 2004
SCC 47 (S.C.C.).
51
Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 38, at 253.
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given air- or watershed.52 Regulatory standards target specific concentrations
of pollutants at a given point source (e.g., a smokestack, effluent pipe, etc.)
but do not limit the total volume of emissions. Thus, under our current
regulatory framework a Ministry of Environment could issue one permit
allowing for x parts per billion of a given contaminant, or 1,000 such
permits, in any given area. The inevitable result of such a system is the
uneven distribution of environmental harm across communities, and the
creation of so-called “pollution hotspots”.53 As a general rule, such hotspots
do not occur in privileged communities. Although less well studied
in Canada than elsewhere, the phenomenon of “environmental injustice”, or
the discriminatory allocation of environmental benefits and burdens, is alive
and well in this country. 54 Consider, for example, the disproportionate
prevalence of boil-water advisories (and water-borne illness) in Aboriginal
communities.55 If disparities in environmental protection occur on enumerated
or analogous grounds, then there may be a viable claim under section 15.56
The purpose of section 15 is to promote “a society in which all are secure in
the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings equally
deserving of concern, respect and consideration” 57 and this includes
providing “an equality of benefit and protection”. To paraphrase Chalifour, a
safe environment:
is one of the most basic human needs for survival, and lack of access to
it undermines health, dignity and standard of living, increases the cost
of living, and creates physiological and psychological stress. It can
impede one’s ability to care for one’s family, to have adequate personal
hygiene, and otherwise to be on an equal playing field with other
Canadians…58

Arguably the most obvious home for environmental rights in the Charter
is section 7, which protects Canadians from deprivations of the rights to
life, liberty and security of the person that do not comport with the
52

See generally Boyd, Unnatural Law, supra, note 31.
See Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment, supra, note 19, at 155-58.
54
See generally Andil Gosine & Cheryl Teelucksingh, Environmental Justice in Canada
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008); Laura Westra & Bill E. Lawson, eds., Faces of Environmental
Racism: Confronting Issues of Global Justice (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 1995); Tara Ulezalka,
“Race and Waste: The Quest for Environmental Justice” (2007) 26 Temp. J. Sci. Tech. & Envtl. L. 51.
55
See David R. Boyd, “No Taps, No Toilets: First Nations and the Constitutional Right to
Water in Canada” (2011) 57(1) McGill L.J. 81; Chalifour, supra, note 33.
56
See id.
57
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6 at para. 34, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 143 (S.C.J.).
58
Chalifour, supra, note 33, at 211.
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principles of fundamental justice.59 The purpose of section 7 is to protect
the “core of what it means to be an autonomous human being blessed
with dignity and independence in matters that can properly be
characterized as fundamentally or inherently personal”.60 Since Chaoulli,
it is clear that a substantial risk to life may infringe section 7,61 and this
comports with international human rights law. In EHP v. Canada, 62 a
citizens’ group in Port Hope, Ontario alleged that the storage of nuclear
waste in the community threatened residents’ right to life, and the United
Nations Human Rights Committee stated that the claim “raise[d] serious
issues, with regard to the obligation of States parties to protect human
life (article 6 (1))”. The claim was dismissed for failure to exhaust
domestic remedies,63 the Committee noting that:
... since Canada submitted its response to the communication of the
author, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has come into
force on 17 April 1982. ... Section 7 of the Charter states that “everyone
has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principle [sic] of
fundamental justice.” ... If the author believes that the Government or
an agency thereof, such as the Atomic Energy Control Board, is
denying her the right to life in a manner contrary to the provisions of
section 7, she can ask the Courts to remedy this situation. ... 64

“Security of the person encompasses ‘a notion of personal autonomy
involving … control over one’s bodily integrity free from state
interference’”.65 This right protects individuals from serious state-imposed

59
Gage, supra, note 29; Vlavianos, supra, note 29. See also Nickie Vlavianos, “The
Intersection of Human Rights Law and Environmental Law”, paper presented at the Symposium on
Environmental Education for Judges and Court Practitioners, organized by CIRL and sponsored by
Environment Canada (March 23-24, 2012), online: <http://cirl.ca/files/cirl/nickie_vlavianos-en.pdf>
(last visited October 23, 2015).
60
R. v. Clay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 80, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 735 (S.C.C.).
61
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”]. See also Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services
Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134, 2011 SCC 44 (S.C.C.); Canada (Attorney
General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, 2013 SCC 72 (S.C.C.).
62
Communication No. 67/1980, in UNITED NATIONS, 2 SELECTED DECISIONS OF
THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, at 20, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990) [hereinafter “EHP v. Canada”].
63
Id., at para. 8.
64
Id., at para. 7.
65
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, 2015
SCC 5, at para. 64 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Carter”] citing Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney
General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at 587-88 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”].
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risk to physical health66 and also protects an individual’s psychological
integrity. 67 The protection is limited to deprivations that violate a
principle of fundamental justice, many of which are relevant in the
environmental context.68 The liberty interest protected by section 7 includes
the individual’s right to make “important and fundamental life choices”69
free from state interference, including the choice of where to live.70
There is a paucity of case law addressing environmental harm under
section 7; most cases have been dismissed on procedural or evidentiary
grounds. 71 However, an ongoing lawsuit in Ontario is likely to make
legal history in this area within the next few years. In 2010, two
members of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation in Sarnia, Ontario, filed suit
in the Divisional Court alleging that the approval of additional pollution
by a major local emitter violated their Charter rights to life, liberty,
security of the person and equality. 72 The application challenges in
particular a decision allowing Suncor Energy Products Inc. to increase
production by 24 per cent at a part of its facility known as the “sulphur
recovery plant”, with resulting increases in air emissions. The section 7
claim alleges that the emission of increased air emissions in their highly
contaminated area gives rise to pollution levels that threaten the
applicants’ health and that of their families, thus violating their section 7
rights to life, liberty and security of the person. Under section 15, the
66
See Chaoulli, supra, note 61; R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30,
at 59 (S.C.C.); Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at para. 47 (S.C.C.).
67
See e.g., Carter, supra, note 65, at para. 64; Rodriguez, supra, note 65; New Brunswick
(Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46
(S.C.C.); Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000] 2
S.C.R. 307 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Blencoe”].
68
See Collins, “Ecologically Literate Reading of the Canadian Charter”, supra, note 14,
at 28-31.
69
Blencoe, supra, note 67, at para. 49 (per Bastarache J.).
70
Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844, at paras. 66-68
(S.C.C.).
71
See e.g., Manicom v. Oxford (County), [1985] O.J. No. 2635, 52 O.R. (2d) 137 (Ont. Div. Ct.);
Energy Probe v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] O.J. No. 537, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 513 (Ont. C.A.);
Coalition of Citizens for a Charter Challenge v. Metropolitan Authority, [1993] N.S.J. No. 182, 10
C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 257 (N.S.S.C. [In Chambers]), revd [1993] N.S.J. No. 404, 108 D.L.R. (4th) 145
(N.S.C.A.); Millership v. Kamloops (City), [2003] B.C.J. No. 109, 2003 BCSC 82 (B.C.S.C.); Locke
v. Calgary (City), [1993] A.J. No. 926, 15 Alta. L.R. 70 (Alta. Q.B.); Fata v. Ontario (Ministry of
the Environment), [2014] O.E.R.T.D. No. 42 (Ont. Environmental Review Tribunal); Mothers
Against Wind Turbines Inc. v. Ontario (Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change), [2015]
O.E.R.T.D. No. 19 (Ont. Environmental Review Tribunal).
72
See Lockridge v. Ontario (Director, Ministry of the Environment), [2012] O.J. No. 3016,
68 C.E.L.R. (3d) 27, 350 D.L.R. (4th) 720 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [hereinafter “Lockridge”].
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applicants contend that the disproportionate pollution of their area results
in adverse effect discrimination against them based on their status as
on-reserve Aboriginal persons.
The area in which the applicants live is one of the most severely
polluted “hotspots” in Canadian history. 73 It is home to a large
concentration of refineries, petrochemical facilities and other heavy
industries (colloquially known as “Chemical Valley”), many of which are
located within a few kilometres of the Aamjiwnaang reserve.74 Among
other things, these facilities emit significant levels of sulphur dioxide
(SO2), hydrogen sulphide (H2S), nitrogen oxides (NOx), fine particulate
matter (PM2.5), benzene and 1,3-butadiene.75 The area has a higher
volume of toxic air pollutants than any other community in Ontario; 76
indeed, the World Health Organization has found that Sarnia has the
worst air quality in Canada.77 The emission of air pollutants in Chemical
Valley includes both permitted, ongoing discharges and those resulting
from accidental malfunctions, including the “flaring” of acid gas at
Suncor’s petroleum refinery.78
The Application alleges that residents of Aamjiwnaang suffer high
rates of asthma, birth defects, miscarriages and stillbirths, skin rashes,
chronic headaches, high blood pressure and cancer. In addition,
Aamjiwnaang is the only community in the world in which the femaleto-male birth ratio has, at times, reached two to one.79 The phenomenon
is complex but could be related to prenatal exposure to the chemical
cocktail of hormone disrupters emitted in Chemical Valley. 80 The
73

See generally Scott, supra, note 32.
Id.; Lockridge, supra, note 72.
75
For an explanation of the health implications of these substances, see Elliot Sigal,
“Systematic Literature Review of Health Outcomes Associated with Living in Proximity to
Petrochemical Industries” (Toronto: Intrinsik Environmental Sciences, 2010).
76
Christina Dhillon & Michael G. Young, “Environmental Racism and First Nations:
A Call for Socially Just Public Policy Development” (2010) 1(1) Canadian Journal of Humanities
and Social Sciences 25, at 27.
77
Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment, supra, note 19, at 156. To access the World
Health Organization’s raw data, see online: <http://www.who.int/phe/health_topics/outdoorair/
databases/en/index.html> (last visited April 2, 2015).
78
Environmental Law Center, “Environmental Rights: Human Rights and Pollution in
Sarnia’s Chemical Valley”, online: <http://www.elc.uvic.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/C2_
ChemicalValleyAssociatesBackgrounder-2011June13.pdf>, at 4 (last visited April 2, 2015).
79
See Constanze A. MacKenzie et al., “Declining Sex Ratio in a First Nation Community”
(2005) 113(10) Environmental Health Perspectives 1295.
80
See Dayna Nadine Scott, “‘Gender Benders’: Sex and Law in the Constitution of Polluted
Bodies” (2009) 17(3) Feminist Legal Studies 241; Dayna Nadine Scott, “Pollution and the Body
Boundary: Exploring Scale, Gender and Remedy” in Janice Richardson & Erica Rackley, eds.,
Feminist Perspectives on Tort Law (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 2012).
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applicants and their immediate families have health problems including
poor immune function, headaches, miscarriages, digestive problems,
cardiovascular problems and respiratory problems such as asthma.
They allege that living in a highly polluted environment violates their
security of the person, both because it exposes them to unreasonable
health risks and because it infringes their right to psychological security.
Given the egregious nature of the pollution at issue in Lockridge, coupled
with sophisticated counsel and a persuasive evidentiary record, this case
has the potential to result in a substantive appellate ruling on
environmental deprivations of section 7 of the Charter.81

VI. THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AS AN
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
While controversial, unwritten constitutional principles (“UCPs”) are
an established part of Canadian constitutional law; they are binding on
both courts and government and have even been used to strike down
legislation in some cases.82 Recognition of the right to environment, or
some species of environmental right or duty, 83 would assist courts in
interpreting environmental legislation, adjudicating environmental claims
under the Charter, and determining environmental powers under sections
91 and 92. In Quebec Secession Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada
described UCPs as follows:
Behind the written word is an historical lineage stretching back through
the ages, which aids in the consideration of the underlying
constitutional principles. These principles inform and sustain the
81
Another very strong environmental claim under sections 7 and 15 was filed in September
of 2015 on behalf of Grassy Narrows First Nation and members thereof who allege that proposed
clear-cut logging on their traditional territory will worsen preexisting mercury contamination and
threaten human health. See Grassy Narrows v. Ontario, Ontario Superior Court of Justice Court File
No. 446/15, online: <http://www.cela.ca/sites/cela.ca/files/Notice%20of%20Application-GN.pdf>
(last visited October 23, 2015).
82
See generally David J. Mullan, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles: The Legacy of
Justice Rand”, Ivan C. Rand Memorial Lecture, University of New Brunswick, 2002 (unpublished);
David Dyzenhaus, “The Deep Structure of Roncarelli v. Duplessis” (2004) 53 University of
New Brunswick 111; Jamie Cameron, “The Written Word and the Constitution’s Vital Unstated
Assumptions”, in Pierre Thibeault, Benoit Pelletier & Louis Perret, eds., Les mélanges Gérald-A.
Beaudoin / Essays in Honour of Gérald A. Beaudoin (Cowansville: Les Éditions Yvon Blais Inc.,
2002); Mark D. Walters, “The Common Law Constitution in Canada: Return of Lex Non Scripta as
Fundamental Law” (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 91; Dale Gibson, “Constitutional Vibes: Reflections on the
Secession Reference and the Unwritten Constitution” (1999) 11 N.J.C.L. 49.
83
See Vlavianos, supra, note 29.
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constitutional text: they are the vital unstated assumptions upon which
the text is based. …These defining principles function in symbiosis.
.....
Although these underlying principles are not explicitly made part of the
Constitution by any written provision, other than in some respects by
the oblique reference in the preamble to … it would be impossible to
conceive of our constitutional structure without them. The principles
dictate major elements of the architecture of the Constitution itself and
are as such its lifeblood.
The principles assist in the interpretation of the text and the delineation
of spheres of jurisdiction, the scope of rights and obligations, and the
role of our political institutions. Equally important, observance of and
respect for these principles is essential to the ongoing process of
constitutional development and evolution of our Constitution as a
“living tree”…84

Writing extra-judicially, McLachlin C.J.C. elaborates: “[U]nwritten
constitutional principles refer to unwritten norms that are essential to a
nation’s history, identity, values and legal system.”85
Whether framed as the “right to a healthy environment” or in more
general terms such as “respect for the environment” or “environmental
protection”, some concept of environmental obligation and/or entitlement
undoubtedly meets all of these criteria.86 Environmental stewardship has
an ages-old place in the lineage of Canadian law. Indeed as far back as
1217, the Charter of the Forest guaranteed to British subjects rights of
access to vital natural resources, which reinforced the civil and political
rights contained in its companion document, the Magna Carta. 87
Environmental protection is judicially and socially recognized as
fundamental to Canadian society, and it is obviously essential to the
evolution  indeed the survival  of our Constitution as a living tree.

84
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at paras. 49-52
(S.C.C.). Note the recurrence of biological language in this passage (“symbiosis”, “lifeblood”,
“living tree”). There seems implicit in this an acknowledgment that all our human structures depend
on our biological survival. In this sense there is no principle more fundamental than that of a healthy
environment.
85
McLachlin, supra, note 20, at 149.
86
See also Shalin M. Sugunasiri, “Public Accountability and Legal Pedagogy: Studies in
Constitutional Law” (2008) 2 J.P.P.L. 93 for an excellent analytical framework for assessing
new UCPs. The right to a healthy environment seems to comport with Sugunasiri’s criteria.
87
See Sir William Blackstone, The Great Charter and Charter of the Forest (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1759).
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Environmental protection is thus an “unwritten principles without which
the law would become contradictory and self-defeating”.88
Importantly, respect for the environment is also a defining feature of
“[i]ndigenous legal traditions [which] are among Canada’s unwritten
normative principles and, with common and civil law, can be said to ‘form
the very foundation of the Constitution of Canada’”.89 Recognition of an
environmental UCP would reflect Indigenous law, thus simultaneously
advancing the goals of reconciliation and sustainability. 90 As Borrows
points out, “[t]he Constitution, though a legal document, serves as a
framework for life and for political action….”91 It is trite (ecological) law
that a framework for life must ensure the protection of the biophysical
environment on which life depends.
Although it has not yet recognized an unwritten constitutional
principle relating to the environment, the Supreme Court of Canada has
described environmental protection in terms that are commensurate with
constitutional protection.92 The Court summarized its own holdings on
this point in British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd:93
...As the Court observed in R. v. Hydro-Québec…, legal measures to
protect the environment ‘relate to a public purpose of superordinate
importance’…. In Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. ... ‘stewardship of
the natural environment’ was described as a fundamental value ... Still
more recently, in 114957 Canada Ltée (Spray-Tech, Société
d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town)… the Court reiterated, at para. 1:
...Our common future, that of every Canadian community,
depends on a healthy environment....This Court has
recognized that ‘(e)veryone is aware that individually and
collectively, we are responsible for preserving the natural
environment ... environmental protection [has] emerged as a
fundamental value in Canadian society’ ....94

88

McLachlin, supra, note 20, at 163.
Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 38, at 108.
90
Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment, supra, note 19.
91
Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, note 38, at 200.
92
See generally Jerry V. DeMarco, “The Supreme Court of Canada’s Recognition of
Fundamental Environmental Values: What Could Be Next in Canadian Environmental Law?” (2007)
17(3) J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 159.
93
[2004] S.C.J. No. 33, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 74 (S.C.C.).
94
Id., at para. 7 (emphasis added, citations omitted). See also R. v. Wholesale Travel Group
Inc., [1991] S.C.J. No. 79, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154, at para. 234 (“Regulatory legislation is essential to the
functioning of our society and to the protection of the public. It responds to the compelling need to
protect the health and safety of the members of our society and to preserve our fragile environment.”).
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In Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.,95 the majority of the Supreme Court
specifically recognized environmental rights, adopting the following
passage from the Law Reform Commission of Canada’s report, Crimes
Against the Environment:
... a fundamental and widely shared value is indeed seriously
contravened by some environmental pollution, a value which we will
refer to as the right to a safe environment.
To some extent, this right and value appears to be new and emerging,
but in part because it is an extension of existing and very traditional
rights and values already protected by criminal law, its presence and
shape even now are largely discernible. Among the new strands of this
fundamental value are, it may be argued, those such as quality of life,
and stewardship of the natural environment. At the same time,
traditional values as well have simply expanded and evolved to include
the environment now as an area and interest of direct and primary
concern. Among these values fundamental to the purposes and
protections of criminal law are the sanctity of life, the inviolability and
integrity of persons, and the protection of human life and health. It is
increasingly understood that certain forms and degrees of
environmental pollution can directly or indirectly, sooner or later,
seriously harm or endanger human life and human health. 96, 97

Taken as a whole, this robust body of dicta from the Supreme Court of
Canada suggests that environmental protection is indeed a higher-order
legal value deserving of constitutional protection.
This makes sense when one considers that the only truly nonderogable laws in human existence are the biophysical ground-rules of
life on Earth. Chief Justice McLachlin suggests that UCPs derive from
natural law, 98 which must surely include these laws of nature. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines eloquently captured this idea in its
celebrated decision in Minors Oposa, a case concerning the
environmental rights of future generations:
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill
of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
95

[1995] S.C.J. No. 62, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 55 (emphasis in original).
97
This passage was quoted again in R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] S.C.J. No. 76, [1997]
3 S.C.R. 213 (S.C.C.), in which the Court upheld the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999,
S.C. 1999, c. 33 as a valid exercise of federal power.
98
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civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
than self-preservation and self-perpetuation[,] the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions.
As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind.99

This logic seems inescapable; physical self-preservation is a fundamental
imperative for all human beings, both individually and collectively. If our
Constitution fails to address the protection of the biophysical
environment on which all of the enumerated rights and powers delineated
therein depend, it must be because the principle of environmental
protection is so fundamental as to be both implicit and obvious, much
like the principle of democracy  a basic, underlying structure that
supports every other provision in the written Constitution. The argument
for recognition of an environmental right or obligation as an unwritten
constitutional principle is logically and legally compelling.

VII. THE CASE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
Since its first appearance on the international stage in the 1972
Stockholm Declaration, the right to a healthy environment has achieved a
stunning level of success in domestic constitutional systems around the
world. The vast majority of constitutions that have been enacted or
amended in the last four decades include some form of explicit
constitutional recognition of the environmental rights of individuals, the
environmental responsibilities of government, or both. 100 Around the
world, more than 90 states have constitutionalized some form of
environmental right, variously described as the right to a healthy,
ecologically balanced, safe, or wholesome environment.101 If one includes
nations that have constitutionalized environmental rights through
interpretation of other rights (e.g., the right to life) or through
incorporation of international or regional human rights instruments, the
number of nations that accord constitutional protection to environmental

99
See Minors Oposa, supra, note 18, at 187, cited in Sumudu Atapattu, “The Right to Life
or the Right to Die Polluted” (2002) 16 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 65, at 106-107.
100
See generally, Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra, note 19.
101
Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra, note 19, at 53-57; Boyd, The Right to
a Healthy Environment, supra, note 19, at 74.
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rights and/or obligations is 147 (out of a total of 193 U.N. members
states).102
In his ground-breaking books, The Environmental Rights Revolution
and The Right to a Healthy Environment, Professor David Boyd
demonstrates that the explicit constitutionalization of environmental rights
produces significant and measurable improvements in environmental
performance, environmental legislation and litigation outcomes. These
benefits are seen across an astonishingly diverse range of political contexts
 including both developing and developed countries with constitutions
ranging from very new 103 to very old. 104 The data are compelling:
compared to countries that lack such protection, nations with constitutional
environmental rights rank higher on multi-indicator assessments
of environmental performance, have smaller “ecological footprints”
(a comprehensive measurement of environmental impact), and have been
more successful in reducing dangerous air pollutants (including
greenhouse gases).105 These relative improvements apply whether nations
are compared with all other countries around the globe or with only those
in their own region (e.g., Africa, the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe and
the Middle East/Central Asia).
Boyd’s data also show that both the content and enforcement
of environmental legislation improves following constitutionalization of
environmental rights. 106 In addition, constitutional entrenchment of
environmental rights has the potential to prevent rollbacks in
environmental legislation such as those that have occurred in Canada
over the past decade.107 Moreover, litigants around the world are
successfully mobilizing their respective constitutional environmental
rights to protect human health and the environment where governments
have failed to do so. In some cases, constitutional environmental
litigation has led to massive environmental remediation projects and
102

Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment, supra, note 19, at 88.
See e.g., South Africa. For the full text of all domestic constitutional provisions relating
to environmental rights, online: <https://circle.ubc.ca/handle/2429/36469> (last visited June 7, 2015).
104
For example, Norway, online: <https://circle.ubc.ca/handle/2429/36469> (last visited June 7,
2015).
105
Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment, supra, note 19, at 107-21. See also
Christopher Jeffords & Lanse Minkler, 2014, “Do Constitutions Matter? The Effects of
Constitutional Environmental Rights Provisions on Environmental Outcomes ”, Working papers 201416, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, online: <https://ideas.repec.org/p/uct/
uconnp/2014-16.html> (last visited April 1, 2015) [hereinafter “Jeffords & Minkler”].
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Healthy Environment” (2015) J. Envtl. L. & Prac. (forthcoming).
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major change in regulatory practice. 108 Boyd concludes that there is
every reason to believe that constitutional environmental protection
would have similarly salutary effects in Canada. In particular, he argues
that the inclusion of the right to a healthy environment in the Canadian
Constitution would: decrease environmentally-induced mortality and
morbidity, preserve our natural heritage for future generations, reflect the
centrality of the environment in Canadian national identity, clarify the
environmental obligations of all levels of government, and reflect the
core importance of environmental values in Indigenous legal systems in
Canada, as well as aligning our Constitution with the international law of
environmental human rights. 109 While constitutional amendment is a
difficult path in Canada,110 these benefits arguably justify the journey.111

VIII. CONCLUSION
If there ever was a time in modern history when an ecologically
silent constitution was justifiable, that time has passed. In the longue
durée, there is no project that merits constitutional recognition more than
that of environmental protection. A constitution not grounded in a
healthy, sustainable environment is a paper temple  a mere recitation
of rights with no real guarantee of their survival over time. Given the
high degree of ecological literacy demonstrated by the Supreme Court of
Canada, it seems likely that we will soon join the international community
in recognizing environmental human rights in our highest law.
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